This study examines the relation between the internationalization of firms and CEO compensation. Starting from a sample of Norwegian and Swedish listed firms we analyze the effects of internationalization as manifest in the capital market (foreign exchange listing), the market for corporate control (foreign board membership), and the product market (export and foreign sales). We conclude that all three markets contribute positively to the compensation level of CEOs. We argue that part of the higher CEO compensation in internationally oriented firms reflects a risk premium for reduction in job security as measured by duration of CEO tenure.
Introduction
During the 1990s CEO compensation increased substantially (Economist, 2000) as did the degree of internationalization (UNCTAD, 2000) . Is there a causal link between the internationalization of the firm and CEO compensation? Whereas earlier studies have identified a positive relationship between the product-market internationalization of the firm and CEO pay (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998) , the present study contributes to theory by explaining the impact of the internationalization of the firm as manifest in the capital market (foreign exchange listing) and the market for corporate control (foreign board membership).
We argue that such international influence does enhance CEO compensation.
A number of studies have suggested that internationalization enhances a firm's financial performance in the product market (e.g., Grant, 1987; Tallman and Li, 1996; Morck and Young, 1991 ; for a review see Contractor et al., 2003) . It is often claimed that the higher level of a firm's performance compensates for the higher risks in international business (e.g., Reeb, Kwok, and Baek, 1998) . We argue that the higher risks (and rewards) linked to the international firm can also be expected to be reflected in the compensation to CEOs.
The study recognizes three components of CEO compensation: non-performancecontingent compensation, performance-contingent compensation, and a risk premium. We argue that a special international risk premium is required by CEOs to counteract their exposure to performance fluctuations that lie beyond their control. We argue that a CEO knows a priori that he or she may be penalized for poor firm performance and that compensation is needed for exposure to an uncertain international environment. The higher level of pay reflects reduced job security, the likelihood of shorter tenure, and a potentially negative impact on the reputation of the incumbent in case of dismissal.
This study suggests that CEO compensation is an internationalization cost that has been neglected. Countries with a relatively low level of CEO compensation can expect to see higher compensation levels as their firms go international and they become integrated into the global market for top executives. Potentially the cost implications could be considerable, as can be seen from the significantly lower earnings of the typical Continental European CEOs relative to their US peers (Economist: September 28, 2000) . Starting from this fact we argue that firms could potentially incur substantial costs if they have to narrow the current pay gap between countries where CEO compensation is low and those where it is high. In a broader perspective the study is an attempt to address the lack of research on the issue of internationalization and corporate governance (Melin, 1992) .
The underlying assumption of the study is the existence of a highly segmented labor market for CEOs across countries. Although institutionally speaking there is legally one labor market for CEOs among EU/EAA-countries (post-1992) , there is still a strong home-country bias when CEOs are being appointed. This assumption is supported by the fact that in 1998 less than ten non-Scandinavians were CEOs in publicly traded firms in Norway and Sweden.
Thus it seems appropriate to study the effect of firm internationalization on CEO compensation within each country, or region. We consider Scandinavia to be one such region.
However, according to other dimensions Scandinavian firms are highly integrated into the world market. Many Scandinavian firms are listed in the largest and according to the general perception the most prestigious capital markets (the Anglo-American), and/or have AngloAmerican board members. We suggest that this may cause institutional contagion from the Anglo-American market system, which in turn is likely to have a strong effect on important dimensions of corporate governance such as CEO compensation.
In the next section of this paper we review past studies on CEO compensation. We pay special attention to the relevance of microeconomic theory, agency theory, managerial discretion theory, and organizational theory on CEO power. In the section thereafter we propose three relevant research hypotheses to be tested. This is followed by a section where we describe the Norwegian and Swedish data and the applied methodology. Then follows a section in which we test the hypothesized relationships in a multivariate setting. In the final section the key findings are summarized and managerial and policy implications are discussed.
Conceptual framework
The research on CEO compensation is rich, and the subject has been tackled within economics (e.g., Becker, 1975) , finance (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990) , accounting (e.g., Murphy, 2000) , and management (e.g., Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997) . However, one common drawback is that the relationship between firm internationalization and CEO compensation is rarely addressed. Sanders and Carpenter's (1998) study on US firms is one exception. Miller, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (2002 ) is another. However, both these studies are limited to the internationalization of the firm in the product market.
We argue that the incremental effect of internationalization on CEO compensation reflects the demand and supply for internationally competent top executives. We also suggest that the compensation level in internationally oriented firms reflects a risk premium justified by the harsher monitoring conducted by international owners and board members, i.e., less tolerance for poor performance than in the absence of such monitoring. This stricter monitoring is introduced into our study by way of the internationalization of firms as manifest in the capital market and the market for corporate control.
Human capital theory suggests that any job requirements that limit the supply of CEO candidates would enhance CEO pay (e.g., Agarwal, 1981; Harris and Helfat, 1997) . This suggests in turn that internationalization affects the domestic labor markets for CEOs. The skills and competencies necessary to manage an international firm are more scarce than the skills required for a domestically focused business -i.e., the supply of capable internationally oriented CEOs is limited. Specifically, we argue that firms with a high degree of export and foreign sales renders the CEO more exposed to outcomes beyond his or her control.
Moreover, a firm's international expansion exposes the CEO to more exogenous variables than mere domestic diversification does. We expect to see a risk premium charged by CEOs for being exposed to a greater number of such risk factors (e.g., in terms of macro-economic fluctuations; see Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1997) . Similarly, we suggest that CEOs require a risk premium for being evaluated by international board members and international regulatory authorities.
In terms of managerial discretion theory, internationalization provides a complex task environment for the CEO (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998) .
Whereas human capital theory emphasizes the effect of internationalization on the supply of competent CEOs, managerial discretion theory focuses on the demand-side effect, i.e., international firms are probably willing to pay a higher salary for the service of the internationally competent CEO. The firm can then benefit from having an internationally oriented CEO who can deal successfully with both domestic and foreign customers and suppliers. Furthermore, the successful internationally oriented CEO is also able to cope with domestic and foreign board members, domestic and foreign regulators, and domestic and foreign investors.
Agency theory provides a normative approach to the compensation issue, and focuses on the way the compensation package (including options) should bridge the incentive gap between managers and owners (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) . The focus of agency theory is not on the starting salary but on the way incentives can affect managerial behavior. The implication is that companies should be paying CEOs more than the labor market for CEOs would suggest (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990) , focusing instead on how incentives can induce managers to create shareholder value (Hall and Liebmann, 1998) .
However, empirical research on performance-contingent compensation has in general produced weak results. For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Sloan (1993) find a small but significant relationship between profitability and CEO compensation. A meta-analysis reported by Tosi et al. (2000) , and based largely on US data, found that only 5 percent of the variance in CEO pay can be linked to performance. Furthermore, we expect to see even smaller effects in countries where stock option programs are less common, as they were in the Scandinavian countries during the period under study (1996) (1997) (1998) . A recent study of Scandinavian firms thus failed to identify any significant relationship between performance and CEO pay (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002) . In light of these indications, we have used the payperformance sensitivity as a control variable.
Organizational power theory argues that the labor market for CEOs can deviate from the characteristics of a competitive labor market, that is to say CEO compensation can rise above the level that supply-side factors (human capital theory) and demand-side factors (managerial discretion theory) would suggest. US-based research indicates that some CEOstypically these with long tenure -have been "successful" in building an in-house power base (Boyd, 1994; Zajac and Westphal, 1996) . Specifically, past research indicates that large boards, or board with few independent members, may be lax monitors of their CEOs (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Core et al., 1999) . However, these factors may be of less importance in Scandinavia due to the strong egalitarian culture there (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002) . We therefore include board size, CEO tenure, and board independence as control variables.
Hypotheses
We suggest that four sources of international influence affect CEO compensation. The first source of international influence is an institutional spillover effect. We recognize that CEO compensation is far higher in the US than in any other country (Economist, September 20, 2000) . Likewise, the CEO compensation level in the UK is higher than that of the rest of Europe. This leads us to suggest that any Anglo-American influence in the internationalization process of the firm will also affect the compensation schemes. This effect is likely to be particularly important in Scandinavia, as Norwegian and Swedish CEOs are among the lowest paid of their kind in Europe. Over time this effect may grow weaker if the labor market for CEOs becomes globally integrated. The second source is the supply effect (human capital theory), connected with the smaller pool of CEOs who are fit for the more challenging task of doing business internationally rather than just domestically. The third effect is a demand effect as postulated in managerial discretion theory. The fourth source of international influence is related to the harsher monitoring of international corporate governance, and the risk of dismissal this implies for the CEO. We suggest that this risk effect is probably present specifically among firms which have representatives of the more demanding corporate system on their own boards.
We claim that from the CEO's point of view the Anglo-American corporate governance system is the most demanding system in the world. We base our view on factors such as a high risk of dismissal, a focus on short-term (quarterly) results, and a high degree of transparency vis-à-vis investors. The conventional wisdom is that the more demanding the system the smaller the degree of freedom for the CEO (see e.g., Economist, 2001: 32). The form of corporate governance within the Scandinavian capital markets, and indeed in most countries in Continental Europe, is the so-called insider or control-oriented system (Berglöf, 2000; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999) . In this corporate governance system the emphasis is on the ability of large shareholders to monitor corporate behavior (Angblad, Berglöf, Högfeldt, and Svancar, 2001) , whereas the Anglo-American system puts more emphasis on monitoring by way of board independence, a market for corporate control, and institutional monitoring (e.g., SEC, and stock exchanges). On a basis of the above arguments we suggest that firms in non-Anglo-American countries which attempt to move toward the Anglo-American system of corporate governance, would need to change their CEO compensation schemes.
We argue that if a firm chooses to comply with the Anglo-American corporate governance system, then the CEO requires a risk premium for the harsher monitoring (i.e. in relation to the domestic version). This pay premium reflects the potential loss of reputation and the reduced job security for the CEO. We point out two specific firm activities that signal compliance with an Anglo-American standard of corporate governance monitoring to the international investor community, and that open the way for an institutional spill-over effect.
Signals of this kind imply an upgrading of the corporate governance monitoring provided by the domestic system alone. These activities are 1) effecting an international cross-listing, that is to say a listing on a foreign stock exchange, and 2) the recruiting of at least one independent board member representing a more demanding corporate governance system, i.e. primarily the Anglo-American system.
International cross-listing is a generally recognized way of breaking away from a domestic capital market (e.g., Howe and Madura, 1990; Sundaram and Logue, 1996; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999) . The cross-listing implies that the firm will be scrutinized by a new international investor clientele, it will be exposed to new regulatory authorities, and it will need to comply with new standards as regards disclosure and accounting. We argue that an international cross-listing exposes the CEO to higher career risks and rewards, involving all the four sources of influence mentioned above. For most firms from semi-segmented capital markets, not counting the few companies which already enjoy an international cost of capital, an Anglo-American stock exchange listing is a big step for which they are rewarded in terms of a higher market value (Stulz, 1999) . For the Scandinavian countries this effect has been documented (Modén and Oxelheim, 1997; Randøy, et al., 2001) . We claim that part of the value creation arising from such an international cross-listing is captured by the CEO (rent seeking) that process the scarce set of skills necessary for the cross-listing. Furthermore, we suggest that due to the more demanding work requirements (limiting the supply of competent CEOs) and the greater risk of dismissal (risk premium), the CEOs of firms with an AngloAmerican exchange listing are rewarded with higher pay.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between Anglo-American exchange listing and CEO compensation.
Corporate governance research recognizes the essential role of the board of directors in sustaining an effective organization (OECD, 1999; Jensen, 1993) . Furthermore, CEO compensation research indicates that board structure (e.g. its size and independence) can potentially affect CEO compensation (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand, 1999; Yermack, 1996) . The firm can thus signal its compliance with a more demanding corporate governance system (the Anglo-American) by recruiting an outsider Anglo-American board member.
We argue that independent outsider Anglo-American board members bring with them the corporate governance culture of their home country. This suggests that an AngloAmerican board member, as a representative of a foreign corporate governance system, could boost the incentive structure of top management -which in small or emerging economies is usually less highly developed. Consequently, CEOs in such a position will be exposed to a clash between two corporate governance cultures, and the reconciliation of the two systems will pose new challenges and tasks for them. Among other things this may call for a new corporate language (Oxelheim, et al., 1998) , new internal reporting requirements, and new investor-relation activities (Useem, 1998) . Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) have recently shown that Anglo-American board membership enhances firm value among Scandinavian firms. We argue that part of the value creation from the inclusion of an outsider Anglo American board member is captured by the CEO (rent seeking). Furthermore, we argue that the CEOs of firms with Anglo-American board members demand a risk premium relative to other firms lacking such membership.
Since the members on a typical Scandinavian board are also the people who are in charge of setting compensation levels (no separate compensation committee), we expect AngloAmerican board membership to have a direct effect on compensation. Finally, the new job requirements serve to limit the pool of capable CEOs. We hypothesize that taken together these four sources of influence will increase CEO compensation in firms with AngloAmerican board members.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between Anglo-American board membership and CEO compensation.
In hypotheses 1 and 2 we have argued that the effect of foreign listing and foreign board membership is associated with prestigious capital markets where CEO pay is high (the Anglo-American markets in particular). Next, we suggest that there is a product-market effect on CEO compensation that stems from export and foreign sales. We claim that more productmarket internationalization relating to any foreign country can be expected to affect CEO supply (fewer qualified candidates) and CEO demand (enhanced benefits accruing to firms with highly capable CEOs).
An export-dominated business faces a more complex customer environment than a domestic firm. A common requirement is that potential CEOs should be genuinely bi-lingual and multi-cultural. Another qualification expected of the CEO candidates is substantial work experience abroad, or an international educational background. In line with human capital theory, we suggest that the complexity of managing an export intensive and foreign-sales intensive firm is likely to reduce significantly the supply of CEOs potentially qualified for the businesses concerned. In addition, the competence required to manage the greater macroeconomic and political risks accompanying international business (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1997) will further limit the supply of potential CEO candidates.
Because of its higher job requirements firms can be expected to be more willing to pay for a highly competent CEO. In line with the US-based study reported in Sanders and Carpenter (1998) , we expect the CEOs of export and foreign-sales oriented firms to receive higher compensation than domestically focused firms. We expect such a pay premium since export and foreign-sales intensive firms demand greater managerial discretion, and/or higher compensation on account of the greater potential for rent seeking (since internationalization enhances profitability).
Finally, we argue that a risk premium is included in the compensation package paid by firms that are highly intensive on the export and foreign-sales side. The premium covers the fact that the CEO of such a firm is evaluated in terms of a larger set of outcomes over which he or she can exert hardly any influence, for example exogenous changes in the economic and political environment of the firm (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 2004) . However, this increase in risk may be offset by the firms' diversification effects, such that the net effect of productmarket internationalization on CEO pay remains uncertain.
Taken together, the demand and the supply of CEO candidates who have been educated for the international business task and the rent-seeking argument, suggest that firms with a high percentage of export and foreign sales are likely to be paying higher compensation to their CEOs.
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between a firm's level of export and foreign sales and CEO compensation.

Data and Methodology Data
In 1998 there were 194 Norwegian and 304 Swedish firms listed on the countries' respective exchanges. The numbers include the secondary exchange but exclude foreign companies not headquartered in Norway or Sweden. For this study we collected information from a random sample of 132 Norwegian and 120 Swedish firms. Due to incomplete data, withdrawal from the population (delisting etc.) and a few non-responses (15 cases with no systematic relation to size or industry), we ended up with complete information from 100 Norwegian and 96
Swedish companies. Our sample includes companies from all industries apart from banking and insurance. We exclude these two industries since their firms are subject to special regulations as regards board composition and foreign acquisitions.
This study has been able to use a unique set of primary data, supplemented by data from secondary sources (annual reports, Sundqvist, 1999) . Specifically we had to collect firmlevel data on the nationality of board members, CEO tenure, and board independence. We conducted telephone interviews with fax follow-ups to collect data on these variables.
Measures
The dependent variable -CEO compensation in 1997 and 1998 (two observations per firm) -includes all the major components of CEO remuneration: salary, bonuses ( cash and stock), and publicly traded stock options. 1 Norwegian and Swedish firms generally disclose specific information with regard to both bonuses and stock options. However, stock options are not consistently reported, which makes between-firm comparisons practically impossible. It also makes it hard to separate the effect of short-term compensation (bonus and salary) and longterm compensation (stock options). Firm-level observations reveal that a relatively small part of a CEOs payment comes in the form of bonuses. Forty-two percent of the Swedish sample companies paid a bonus to their CEOs in 1998, but the bonus was a mere 23 percent of the recipients' total compensation. Furthermore, prior to July 1998 (in Sweden) and January 1999 (in Norway), stock options were uncommon on account of the prohibitive taxation. For example, before July 1998 in Sweden and January 1999 in Norway employees' stock options were taxed when vested. In Sweden this implied full marginal tax (up to the 56 percent rate).
In addition employers were responsible for social security tax (7 percent rate). Our data does not indicate that the Swedish change of law in July 1998 had an immediate impact on the use of stock options in the sample firms. Ideally, we would have liked to separate the effect of short-term and long-term compensation. However, the relatively small size of the granted stock options during the study period suggests that the issue would prove to be of minor importance.
The independent variables are lagged one year with respect to the dependent variable, which means that our independent variables are from 1996 and 1997. In view of the fact that CEO compensation levels are not being constantly evaluated (as is the case for stock prices),
we suggest that using a one-year time lag provides a more accurate description of CEO pay practices. Compensation is adjusted in accordance with the previous year's level of export and foreign sales, the corporate governance, etc. This is also consistent with earlier studies of CEO compensation, which have commonly applied a one-year time lag for the effect of performance (e.g., Kerr and Bettis, 1987) . By using two observation years per firm we avoid the possibility of identifying one-year effects.
Foreign exchange listing is assigned a value of 1 if the firm is listed on an official stock exchange in an Anglo-American capital market, 0 otherwise. Nine percent of the sample firms have an Anglo-American foreign exchange listing. The explanatory variable foreign board membership is measured as 1 if one (or more than one) "outsider" board member is a citizen of either Canada, the US or the UK; 0, otherwise. A director is considered an "insider" director if he or she is or has been directly or indirectly employed by the firm. We choose not to use the share of outsider Anglo-American board members, since the signaling effect of Anglo-American corporate-governance influence would be achieved by the inclusion of even one Anglo-American board member. This argument has previously been used by Oxelheim and Randøy (2003) . Furthermore, the Scandinavian sample contains very few boards with two or more Anglo-American members. Thirteen percent of the sample firms have one or more Anglo-American board members. Export and foreign sales refers to the percentage of the firm's total revenues generated by export and sales for foreign affiliates. On average 51 percent of the total revenues of the sample firms come from export and foreign sales.
Control variables
We control for firm size since earlier research has shown that size has a significant effect on CEO performance (e.g., Baumol, 1967) . Firm size is measured by taking the natural logarithm of total market capitalization. We also include stock market performance, as suggested by agency theory (e.g., Tosi et al., 2000) . Performance is measured by the firm's stock performance the previous year. In line with earlier CEO compensation research we also control for board size (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) . Following organizational power theory and general corporate governance considerations (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998; OECD, 1999) , we control for board independence, board size, and CEO tenure. Tenure is measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years the CEO has been in power. Board size is the number of directors on the board. Board independence is the percentage of independent outside directors on the board. A director is considered to be an inside director if he or she is or has been directly or indirectly employed by the firm, either as an employee or as a manager. Firm age is measured by the logarithm of the number of years between the observation year and the firm's founding year. Due to the frequent appearance of zero value on one variable, we have not used the natural logarithm for the entire equationsomething that would otherwise have facilitated comparisons of elasticity. We control for country effects by assigning Swedish firms a value of 1 and Norwegian firms a value of 0.
Method
We use a cross-sectional ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression model to test the hypotheses presented in the preceding section. In addition to the hypothesized effects we apply a variety of control variables to minimize specification bias in the hypothesis testing, drawing on previous research on CEO compensation. Specifically, we control for relevant corporate governance variables (CEO tenure, board independence, and board size) and for general firm characteristics (firm size, performance), country, and industry effects (using single-digit industry dummies).
Since the three internationalization factors are correlated to some extent (as high as 0.42),
we perform separate tests for each factor (Models 1-3) and use one model in which all the international factors are combined (Model 4). Equation (1) describes the relationships expressed in Model 4.
(1) CEO Compensation year t = α + β 1 * Foreign Exchange Listing t-1 + β 2 * Foreign Board Membership t-1 +β 3 * Export and Foreign Sales Intensity t-1 + β 4 *Firm Size t-1 + β 5 *Firm Performance t-1 + β 6 *Board Size t-1 + β 7 *Board Independence t-1 + β 8 *Country + β 9 *CEO Tenure + β i *Industry Dummies
We argue that the CEOs of international firms are exposed to a greater risk of dismissal than the CEOs of domestically focused firms. Empirically, we have looked at the effect of internationalization on the risk of dismissal -measured as CEO tenure -as a proxy for such a risk factor. For our exploratory analysis of CEO tenure (Equation 2), we control for firm size, firm age, debt ratio, board size, board independence, performance (market-to-book one-year changes), and country. Our argument is that the likelihood of CEO dismissal is affected by the contingencies of the firm (age and size), and by the corporate control mechanisms of debt (Shleifer og Vishny, 1997). Firm age is measured by the logarithm of the number of years between the observation year and the firm's founding year. Debt is measured as the ratio of equity to total assets. To assess the specific international risk premium we have run the following regression:
(2) CEO Tenure (ln) = α + β 1 * Foreign Exchange Listing t-1 + β 2 * Foreign Board Membership t-1 +β 3 * Export and Foreign Sales Intensity t-1 + β 4 *Firm Size t-1 + β 5 *Firm Age t-1 + β 6 *Debt ratio t-1 +β 7 *Country + β 8 *Firm Performance t-1 + β 9 *Board Size t-1 + β 10 *Board Independence t-1
Analysis and results
Analysis of the regression residuals indicates no problems either of heteroscedasticity or of non-normal distributions. With the possible exception of the board size/firm size correlation (.63), the correlation coefficients indicate no problems of multicollinearity. In order to address this potential problem separate tests were performed with the board size variable and without it (not reported). The results were robust to this specification and we therefore report only the model that includes both variables. Finally, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics (<10) did not indicate any multicollinearity problems.
We argue that internationalization causes firms to pay higher CEO compensation. On the other hand, reversed causality would imply that by offering CEOs higher compensation a firm might be able to enhance internationalization. In this study we have run several regressions to see whether compensation leads internationalization. Specifically, we explored whether CEO compensation in 1996 (as well as control variables from Equation 1) affected internationalization in 1998 (unreported). We found no indication of such a reversed causality.
Furthermore, recent studies on the related issue of internationalization and performance do not indicate reversed causality of this kind (e.g., Oxelheim and Randøy, 2003) . The result of these studies points in the direction of internationalization leading performance. Furthermore, our use of lagged variables helps to mitigate a potential endogeneity problem. Finally, the correlation between export and foreign sales on the one hand and CEO compensation on the other (.17) is significant at the 1%-level.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The results reported in Table 2 support the existence of a CEO pay package risk premium related to internationalization. After controling for firm size, firm age, debt, firm performance, board size, board independence, and country, we find that firms with AngloAmerican board membership "penalize" their CEOs in terms of significantly shorter tenure.
We also find a negative relationship between Anglo-American listing and CEO tenure, but significant at p=.118 only. Hence, we believe there is a risk premium embedded in the compensation package to the CEO of a firm with Anglo-American board membership. We argue that the effect of boards is stronger than the effect of exchange listing, as board members of this kind can directly influence the level of CEO-pay.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The multivariate model (Equation 1) shows that the three aspects of internationalization (product market, capital market, and corporate control market) help both collectively and individually to explain the CEO pay level (Table 3) . Whereas the control factors explain 47 percent of the variation in CEO compensation, this rises to 56 percent when all three internationalization variables are included (significant at the .001-level).
As suggested by Hypothesis 1, we find a significant (p<.01) and positive relationship between foreign exchange listing and CEO compensation (Table 3 ). This effect is found both for both the full model (#4) and for the model including foreign exchange listing only. We also performed additional tests (unreported) to find out whether this effect was stable across sample years and countries. We found that the effect was significant at the .001-level for
Sweden, but significant only at the p=.145 (two-tailed) for Norway. The effect of listing was significant at the .001-level for 1998 but only at p=.074 (two-tailed) for 1997.
We also find a significant (p<.001) and positive relationship between Anglo-American board membership and CEO compensation (Hypothesis 2). This is found both for the full model and for the model including Anglo-American board membership only. In addition, we found that this effect was significant at the .05-level for both Norway and Sweden, and across the sample years (unreported).
Finally, we also indentified a significant (p<.001) and positive relationship between export and foreign sales on the one hand, and CEO compensation on the other (Hypothesis 3). This is found both for the full model and for the model including export and foreign sales only. In addition, we found that the effect was significant at the .05-level for both Norway and Sweden, and across the sample years.
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[Insert Table 3 and the greater willingness of firms to pay for the managing of the complexities entailed (i.e., a managerial discretion effect) can explain the significant positive effect of foreign listing on CEO pay. Anglo-American foreign exchange listing also puts additional pressure on the firm to perform well, which explains the negative relationship between Anglo-American foreign exchange listing and CEO tenure. Part of the higher compensation may thus represent a risk premium.
The multivariate analysis suggests that Anglo-American board membership has a positive effect on the CEO compensation level. The magnitude of this effect is between SEK 0.9 and 1.1 million (approximately $110,000-140,000). We argue, first, that Anglo-American board members are likely to be more willing to pay a higher salary, in line with the common pay practices in Anglo-American markets. Second, we suggest that Anglo-American board members can be expected to strengthen the focus on corporate performance, implying higher pay for CEOs but also a greater probability of being dismissed. Hence, part of the higher compensation should be interpreted as a risk premium.
The result of this study, based on Norwegian and Swedish data, indicate that a firm with 50 percent of its total sales going to export pays its CEO between SEK 350,000 and 470,000 more than firms without any export and foreign sales pay theirs (approximately $45,000-60,000). The same kind of effect has previously been found among US firms (Sanders and Carpenter, 1998; Carpenter et al, 2002) . This effect can be attributed to two sources. First, firms with high export and foreign sales intensity allow their CEOs greater managerial discretion, which also makes them willing to offer greater compensation to highly competent CEOs (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998) . Second, we attribute this effect to the limited supply of competent and internationally oriented CEOs, which in turn serves to boost their pay level.
We argue that Norway and Sweden are particularly suitable for studies on the issue of internationalization and CEO pay, since Scandinavia hosts some of the world's most highly internationalized firms (UNCTAD, 2000) . The results are appealing and robust. However, further research needs to concentrate on a broader spectrum of countries to seek validity for a generalization of the results. Moreover, further research efforts should be made to identify the relative weight of supply-and-demand conditions and the risk-premium element in the overall picture. A deeper knowledge of the relative significance of these would help the board and/or the compensation committee to design an appropriate compensation scheme. 
